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1978-1979 SECURITIES LAW DEVELOPMENTS
I. WHAT IS A SECURITY?
Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court' have limited
access to federal court under the federal securities laws' by establishing
stringent standards for stating a cause of action.3 In International Brother-
hood of Teamsters v. Daniel,4 the Court recently evidenced its intention
to limit further access to federal court by restricting federal subject matter
jurisdiction in securities cases. The Daniel Court, in interpreting the Se-
curities Acts' definition of "security," 5 strictly construed the judicial defi-
nition of "investment contract"' first enunciated in SEC v. W. J. Howey
See, e.g., Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723 (1975). See generally Campbell, Voluntary Recapitalizations, Fairness and Rule 10b-
5: Life Along the Trail of Sante Fe, 66 Ky. L. J. 267, 298 (1978); Lowenfels, Recent Supreme
Court Decisions Under The Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEO. L. J.
891, 891-919 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Lowenfels]; Walker, Restitutionary Relief In The
Absence Of Standing To Challenge Violations Of Rule 10b-5 And Section 14(e), 23 Loy. L.
REv. 893, 893-97 (1977).
2 The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976) [hereinafter cited as '33
Act], and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976) [hereinafter
cited as '34 Act], provide for the federal regulation of the issuance and sale of securities. The
Acts are designed to protect the investing public by mandating the disclosure of material
information to prospective investors. 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 109, 161 (1972). The '33
Act requires issuers of securities to effect disclosure by filing registration statements with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) which then makes the statements available for
public inspection. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976); 1977-78 Securities Law Developments: What
Is A Security?, 35 WASH. & LEE L. Rv. 757, 757 n.3 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1977-78
Developments]. The '34 Act requires issuers to meet similar registration requirements before
the issuers' securities are traded on a national securities exchange. 15 U.S.C. § 781 (a), (g)
(1976); see Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities Regulation, 16 Bus.
LAw. 300, 301 n.4 (1961).
See Lowenfels, supra note 1, at 891-92.
99 S. Ct. 790 (1979).
Both the '33 Act and the '34 Act regulate transactions involving securities. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77e, 781 (1976). The Acts define "security" in substantially identical terms. Compare 15
U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976) with 15 U.S.C. § 78c(10) (1976). The Supreme Court has recognized
the similarity between the Acts in this regard and has treated the respective definitions as
coextensive. 99 S. Ct. at 795.
Defendants who challenge an instrument's status as a security contend that the federal
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Commander's Palace Park Assocs. v. Girard &
Pastel Corp., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,427 (5th Cir. 1978);
Hilgeman v. National Ins. Co. of America, 444 F.2d 446, 447 (5th Cir. 1971); Olpin v. Ideal
Nat'l Ins. Co., 419 F.2d 1250, 1254-55 (10th Cir. 1969). See also 1977-78 Developments, supra
note 2, at 761-63.
The Supreme Court frst construed the term "security," as defined in the '33 Act, in
SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943). See 12 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 494
(1944); 17 So. CAL. L. Rav. 324 (1944). The Court interpreted the broad definition of
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Co.7 Under the Howey test, a transaction constitutes an investment con-
tract when it involves "an investment of money in a common enterprise
with profits to come solely from the efforts of others."8 The Daniel Court's
restraint contrasts with the Court's prior decisions defining securities,9 and
the trend in lower courts extending the Acts' coverage to transactions
having little resemblance to traditional security sales."0
Daniel raised the issue of whether a compulsory," noncontributory 2
"security" in light of the evils that Congress intended the '33 Act to eliminate. 320 U.S. at
354. In order to establish the speculative character of the transaction, the Court analyzed the
terms of the seller's offer, the manner in which the contracts were distributed, and the
economic inducements held out to prospective buyers. Id. at 352-53 & n.10.
In SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), the Court applied the principles
underlying its decision in Joiner and held that interests in a citrus grove constituted securities
under the '33 Act. Id. at 298-301; see 46 COLUM. L. REv. 885 (1946). Some of the buyers also
entered into service contracts with the owner under which the owner assumed sole responsibil-
ity for the development and cultivation of the buyer's acreage. 328 U.S. at 296. The defen-
dants agreed to pay each buyer a portion of the profits earned from the defendant's sale of
the fruit. Id. Moreover, since the individual lots were relatively small, management of the
tracts on an unconsolidated basis would have been impractical. Id. at 300. The Howey Court
concluded that since the grove owner had led buyers to expect profits from the efforts of others
engaged in a common enterprise, the purchase agreements and service contracts together
composed investment contracts within the '33 Act's definition of "security." Id. at 299-301;
see 15 U.S.C. § 77b (3) (1976).
The Howey definition of "investment contract" was dispositive in Tcherepnin v. Knight,
389 U.S. 332 (1967). See 19 CASE W. L. Rav. 1123 (1968); 81 HARv. L. Rav. 495 (1967). The
Tcherepnin Court held that certain withdrawable capital shares in a savings and loan associa-
tion, which entitled holders to fluctuating dividends and a voice in management decisions,
were securities under the '34 Act. 389 U.S. at 537-40; see text accompanying note 5 supra.
The shares clearly fell within the ambit of the Howey test since the holders had paid for the
shares and were entitled to profits in the form of dividends which depended upon the manage-
ment's ability to lend the funds wisely. Id. at 338-39. Noting that shares in building and loan
associations were exempt from the registration requirements of the Acts, id. at 340-42, the
Court assumed that the exemption would not have been necessary unless the shares were
otherwise securities. Id. Consequently, the antifraud provisions of the Acts applied to transac-
tions involving the capital shares. Id. at 341.
The Court held for the first time that a certain economic interest did not constitute a
security in United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). See Shares in Housing Co-
op Are Not "Securities" 62 A.B.A. J. 114 (1976); The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV.
L. REv. 254 (1975); 1977-78 Developments, supra note 2, at 761-63. In Forman, shares of stock
in a housing cooperative entitled the shareholders to lease rental units in the cooperative. 421
U.S. at 840. Notwithstanding the term used by the parties to describe the interests, the Court
held that the shares were not stock within the meaning of the Acts. Id. at 847-51; see 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77e (3), 78(c) (10) (1976); text accompanying notes 82-119 infra. Since the plaintiffs had
not acquired their shares with an expectation of profits, their interests were not investment
contracts under the Howey analysis. 421 U.S. at 451-57; see text accompanying note 8 infra.
328 U.S. 293 (1946).
Id. at 299.
See note 6 supra.
so See, e.g., Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., 494 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Herr, 338 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 999 (1966).
" 99 S. Ct. at 793. A compulsory plan requires qualified employees to participate in the
plan. Id.
32 Id. Under noncontributory plans, the employers are responsible for providing the funds
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pension plan is a security within the meaning of the federal Securities
Acts. 3 Collective bargaining between Teamsters Local 705 and Chicago
trucking companies first created the plan in 1954." Each employer of
Teamsters was required to contribute a fixed dollar amount per employee
man-week to a Pension Trust Fund." Employees who had served continu-
ously for twenty years became entitled to a pension drawn from the Fund
upon their retirement.'" The Fund's Board of Trustees established the
dollar amount of the pension benefits. The plan's administrator deter-
mined that Daniel, a member of Local 705 since 1950, was ineligible for
pension benefits upon retirement because of a seven month break in his
twenty-three year service period. 8 Daniel's suit" followed his unsuccessful
efforts to have the Fund's Trustees overrule the administrator's decision.
2 '
from which pensions are drawn. See text accompanying notes 15 & 44-46 infra. In Daniel,
employees could not anticipate their pension benefits by receiving directly the employer's
contributions before they retired. 99 S. Ct. at 793.
1' 99 S. Ct. at 793; see note 5 supra. Daniel alleged that the defendants had perpetrated
a fraud in connection with the sale of securities under the Securities Acts and SEC rules. 99
S. Ct. at 794. The plaintiff based his claim on § 17(a) of the '33 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b), and
SEC Rule 1Ob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978). Each of these provisions requires the allegedly
fraudulent transaction to involve securities as defined by the Acts.
" 99 S. Ct. at 793.
'= Id. at 793-94. The collective bargaining agreement established the amount that the
employer was required to contribute to the pension Fund for each man-week of covered
employment. Id. So long as an individual was employed during a given week, regardless of
how many hours he actually worked, the agreement required his employer to contribute to
the Fund to the full extent required by the agreement. Id. at 793 n.2. If the employee worked
overtime, however, the employer's contribution for the week was not increased proportion-
ately. Id.
1' Id. at 794. Employees, like Daniel, who had worked for companies covered by the
agreement before it became effective in 1954, were credited for their pre-agreement employ-
ment in calculating their continuous service time. Id.
11 Id. at 793-94. Employers and the employees' union enjoyed equal representation on the
pension Fund's Board of Trustees. Id. The Board did not set the level of employer contribu-
tions to the Fund. Id.; see text accompanying note 15 supra.
11 99 S. Ct. at 794. The break in Daniel's service was involuntary. He was laid off between
December, 1960 and April, 1961. Between April, 1961, and July, 1961, his employer's bookkee-
per embezzeled the sum intended for the Fund, thereby creating a technical break in Daniel's
service. Id. n.4. During both periods of his break in service, Daniel could have preserved his
eligibility for benefits by contributing to the Fund himself. Id. Daniel's failure to contribute,
however, probably was involuntary as well since while he was laid off, he may have been
financially unable to make payments. Furthermore, during the technical break in his service,
he would have had to detect the embezzelment that created the break prior to contributing
on his own. See text accompanying notes 146-54 infra. Continuous service requirements in
pension plans presently are regulated by the federal government under the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Program, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976). See text accompanying notes
78-81 infra.
11 99 S. Ct. at 794. Daniel named as defendants one of the Fund's Trustees, the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, and his Teamsters' Local.
1 Id. Daniel appealed the administrator's decision to the Fund Trustees on two theories.
He first challenged the administrator's finding that an involuntary break in service could
render him ineligible for benefits. Id. When the Trustees rejected this argument, Daniel asked
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Daniel alleged that the defendants had defrauded himself and other
prospective beneficiaries of Teamster pension funds' by misrepresenting
and withholding the complete facts regarding the circumstances in which
employees became entitled to pension benefits.2 The district court denied
the Teamsters' motion to dismiss the Securities Acts claims23 for failure to
state a cause of action under either the '33 Act or the '34 Act. 4 In denying
the motion, the court reasoned that Daniel's interest in the Fund was an
"investment contract" that had been "sold"2 to him within the Securi-
them to waive the continuous service requirement in his case. Id. Their refusal precipitated
Daniel's suit in federal court. Id.
21 Id. The defendants in Daniel appealed the district court's denial of their preliminary
motion to dismiss. 410 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Ill. 1976); see text accompanying note 23 infra.
Consequently, although Daniel sought to pursue the suit as a class action, the district court
had not decided the classification issue at the time of the appeal. 99 S. Ct. at 794, n.6.
2 99 S. Ct. at 794. The Securities Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 prohibit the misstatement or
omission of material facts in the sale of purchase of securities. See text accompanying note
13 supra. In Daniel, the allegedly misstated and omitted material facts pertained to the
length of the plan's continuous service requirements and the break in service provision. 410
F. Supp. 541, 546 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
2 410 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Ill. 1976); see text accompanying note 13 supra. In addition to
the Securities Acts claims, Daniel alleged that both the International Union and the local
had violated § 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act [NLRA], 99 S. Ct. at 794 n.5; see
29 U.S.C. § 159 (a) (1976). Section 9(a) requires unions to represent their members fairly in
collective bargaining sessions. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (a) (1976). Moreover, Daniel charged all of the
defendants with failing to specify the details of the plan for distributing the Fund's assets in
the collective bargaining agreement as required by § 302 (c)(5) of the NLRA. 99 S. Ct. at
794 n.5; see 29 U.S.C. § 186 (c)(5)(B) (1976). The district court denied the defendants' motion
to dismiss Daniel's claim brought under the NLRA, holding that the allegations were suffi-
cient to state a cause of action and were not barred by applicable statutes of limitation. 410
F. Supp. at 553-56.
Finally, Daniel's complaint charged all of the defendants with common law fraud and
deceit. 99 S. Ct. at 794 n.5. The Supreme Court's recent restriction of the scope of the
Securities Acts' antifraud provisions had tended to increase the importance of common law
fraud as a cause of action in securities cases. See Lowenfels, supra note 1, at 922; 1976-77
Securities Law Developments: Rule 10b-5, 34 WASH. & LEE L. Ray. 882, 921 (1977). For
discussions of the elements of, and remedies for, fraud, in myriad circumstances, see generally
Note, Fraud and Its Remedies, 4 Tax. L. Rav. 510 (1926); Fraudulent Transactions, 3 W. ONT.
L. REv. 2 (1964). The defendants did not move to dismiss Daniel's common law fraud claim.
The court's jurisdiction over the common law claim probably was pendent and dismissal of
the Securities Acts and Labor Act claims alone may have precluded federal jurisdiction over
the common law fraud claim. See generally Note, Problems of Parallel State and Federal
Remedies, 71 HARV. L. REv. 513, 513 n.1, 517 (1958).
24 410 F. Supp. at 545-47; see note 2 supra. The district court considered its determina-
tion that Daniel had purchased a security to be consistent with the remedial purposes of the
Securities Acts. Id. at 549-52; see text accompanying notes 25 & 152 infra.
25 410 F. Supp. at 549-52. The district court applied the Howey test to establish the
existence of an investment contract. Id. at 550-52; see note 8 supra. Characterizing the Fund
as a common enterprise, 410 F. Supp. at 550-51, the court stated that employer contributions
constituted part of the employees' wages and therefore represented indirect employee invest-
ments. Id. at 551. Since the benefits received by pensioned employees would exceed the total
contributions made by their employer on their behalf, the employees acquired an interest in
profits. Id. The efforts of others produced the profits since the Trustees of the Fund controlled
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ties Acts' definitions of "security" and "sale." The Seventh Circuit af-
firmed the district court's orders and the Supreme Court granted the
Teamsters' petition for certiorari.29
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, basing its decision
that Daniel's interest in the Fund was not subject to regulation under the
Securities Acts on three grounds. Beginning with an interpretive analysis
of the Acts, the Court noted that their definitional sections"0 do not refer
specifically to pension plans.3' Since Daniel contended that his participa-
tion in the plan nevertheless was an investment contract," the Court ap-
plied the Howey testl to analyze the nature of his financial interest in the
pension Fund. The major obstacle Daniel faced in attempting to prove that
he had purchased an investment contract was that because of the non-
contributory nature of the plan, Daniel had not invested money directly
in the Fund.U Nevertheless, Daniel contended that he had invested in the
Fund by exchanging his labors for potential pension benefits.,
To resolve the issue, the Court reasoned that Howey's investment ele-
ment requires the exchange of a specific consideration in return for an
identifiable financial interest which has the characteristics of a security.
The Court stated that Daniel's labor was not a specific consideration be-
the investment of the Fund's assets. Id.
21 410 F. Supp. at 552-53. The antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts prohibit only
fraud in connection with the sale of securities. See note 13 supra. The district court held that
the employees covered by the plan had purchased their interests in the Fund by giving
consideration in the form of their labor and a portion of their wages. 410 F. Supp. at 352; see
note 25 supra.
7 410 F. Supp. at 549-50, 552; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b (1), (3), 78c (10), (14) (1976).
21 Daniel v. Iritemational Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977). The Seventh
Circuit agreed with the trial court's determination that Daniel's interest in the Fund was an
investment contract under the Howey test. Id. at 1231-35.
434 U.S. 1061 (1978).
11 99 S. Ct. at 795; see note 5 supra.
1' 99 S. Ct. at 795-96.
32 Id. at 796;*see text accompanying note 8 supra. Most of the securities enumerated in
the Securities Acts can be characterized as documents traded for speculative or investment
purposes. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 297 (1946). Since all investment contracts
cannot be so uniformly characterized, courts invoke the flexibility of the Acts' definitional
sections in order to effectuate the Acts' remedial purposes. Id.
3 See text accompanying note 8 supra. The Daniel Court stated that the economic
realities and substance of transactions determine whether the transactions involve securities.
99 S. Ct. at 796. The terms parties use to describe the interests their dealings create do not
necessarily dictate the character of the interests. Id.; accord, United Hous. Found. v. Forman,
421 U.S. 837 (1975); see note 6 supra.
3, 99 S. Ct. at 796; see text accompanying notes 12 & 25 supra.
31 99 S. Ct. at 796. The district court had held that by accepting an interest in the Fund
as part of his compensation, Daniel had invested in the Fund. 410 F. Supp. at 551. The
Supreme Court rejected the argument. See text accompanying notes 43-46 infra.
u 99 S. Ot. at 796. In deciding whether the relationship between employees and the Fund
constituted an investment under the two part test, the Court purported to characterize the
economic interests at issue in light of the entire transaction from which they arose. See text
accompanying notes 37-40 & 120-45 infra.
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cause the labor he exchanged for his salary could not be separated from
the labor he exchanged for an interest in the Fund.37 The Court further
noted that the benefits constituted a relatively minor part of his total
compensation." Moreover, the labor-compensation transaction did not
create interests that had the characteristics of a security. While recogniz-
ing that Daniel's potential pension benefits may have had the characteris-
tics of a security,39 the Court analyzed Daniel's total compensation as an
indivisible package rather than analyzing each portion of the package
independently." Since the greater part of his compensation clearly did not
have security characteristics," Daniel failed to meet the "investment of
money" criterion of Howey.42
The Court also refused to adopt the position that employer contribu-
tions to the Fund were indirect employee investments. The contributions
did not reflect the employer's relative obligations to particular employees. 3
Instead, the plan established the level of contributions according to total
employee man-weeks," and provided for "defined benefits"4 which did not
vary according to the number of years eligible retirees had worked." Thus,
11 99 S. Ct. at 797. The Daniel Court recognized that an investment may exist where a
party exchanges labor, or any other intangible consideration, for an identifiable economic
interest with security characteristics. Id. n.12; accord, Murphy v. Dare to Be Great, Inc., 3
BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,053 (D. C. Super. 1972); Tew & Freedman, In Support Of SEC
v. W. J. Howey Co.: A Critical Analysis Of The Parameters Of The Economic Relationship
Between An Issuer Of Securities And The Securities Purchaser, 27 U. MrQn L. REv. 407, 412-
14 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Tew & Freedman]. The Court reasoned, however, that Daniel
had not exchanged his labor for an interest in the Fund since his compensation package was
indivisible. 99 S. Ct. at 797; see text accompanying note 40 infra.
I 99 S. Ct. at 797. Although the Daniel Court did not specify each element of the
employees' compensation package, a cash salary presumably constituted the most economi-
cally significant element.
3' 99 S. Ct. at 797. But see text accompanying notes 48-55 infra.
40 99 S. Ct. at 797. In contrast with its decision in Daniel, the Court previously had been
willing to treat an integrated contract as creating two separate economic interests indepen-
dently. See SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202, 207-08 (1967); text accompany-
ing notes 124-34 infra. In United Benefit the Court focused on the fact that the two economic
interests were not interdependent to decide that the interests should be analyzed separately.
See text accompanying notes 124-33 infra. The Daniel Court, forsaking detailed analysis,
rested its decision that Daniel's compensation package should be analyzed as a whole on its
belief that Daniel had perceived the package as an indivisible unit. 99 S. Ct. at 797.
,1 See text accompanying note 38 supra.
12 99 S. Ct. at 797; see text accompanying note 36 supra.
,3 99 S. Ct. at 797; see note 15 supra.
" See note 15 supra.
, 99 S. Ct. at 797. Teamster pension benefits were "defined" in that the Trustees estab-
lished the amount that employees received based on the eligible employee's age at retirement,
and not according to how many.years he had worked. Id. at 793-94 & n.3.
,1 Id. at 794 n.3. By holding that the employer contributions did not constitute invest-
ments of the employees' money, the Court seems to have ignored the economic realities of
the parties' relationship, violating the concepts underlying its previous decisions. See, e.g.,
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). Since the pension plan in Daniel resulted
from collective bargaining, employers may have agreed to contribute to the Fund as an
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the contributions were not sufficiently linked to individual employees to
warrant treating the amounts contributed as employee investments.
Daniel's failure to meet Howey's "investment of money" criterion
would have precluded the Securities Acts' applicability to his interest in
the Fund." However, the Court also addressed the issue of whether Daniel
had acquired his interest with the reasonable expectation of receiving prof-
its from the efforts of others required under Howey.45 The Court first noted
that the Fund had two components in which employees acquired interests.
Additional employer contributions represented the Fund's most significant
component. 9 Since the Fund's managers did not produce these contribu-
tions,50 the Court held that the major part of Daniel's interest would not
have been realized from the efforts of the Fund's managers." Moreover, the
Court reasoned that an employee's receipt of both components of his pen-
sion benefits 2 was contingent primarily upon his ability to meet the plan's
eligibility requirements,53 and not upon the likelihood that investment of
the Fund's assets would produce a profit. 4 Consequently, Daniel's interest
in the Fund's profit-related component also would not be realized primar-
ily from the efforts of others."5
alternative to submitting to employee demands for higher wages. Daniel v. International Bhd.
of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1234-35 (7th Cir. 1977). See also Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB 170
F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949). Since the contributions would thus
be equivalent to increased wages, the Court could have held that the employees, in effect,
made the contributions. See Note, Legal Problems of Private Pension Plans, 70 HARv. L. REv.
490, 494 (1957).
"1 The Court has analyzed all of Howey's elements each time it has determined whether
a transaction constitutes an investment contract under the Howey test. See, e.g., Tcherepnin
v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338-39 (1967). In lower court cases concerning the existence of an
investment contract under Howey, courts have adopted the view that if any one of Howey's
elements is not met, the transaction would not be an invesment contract. See, e.g., Tanuggi
v. Grolier, Inc., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. T 96,880 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), Mr. Steak, Inc. v.
River City Steak, Inc., 460 F.2d 666, 669-70 (10th Cir. 1972).
" 99 S. Ct. at 797-98.
" Id. at 797. The Daniel Court noted that in addition to employer contributions, the
pension Fund's assets represented profits from the Trustees' investment of the employer
contributions. Id. The value of other pension funds which had been merged with the Teamster
Fund constituted the remainder of the Fund's assets. Id. at 798 n.14. Although these parts of
the Fund's assets represented profits produced by the Trustees' efforts, the Court nevertheless
reasoned that the employees' primary interests in the Fund were in the employer contribu-
tions. Id. at 797.
Since the Court purported to apply the Howey test, the fact that the Fund's assets were
predominantly of a nonprofit nature should have been inapposite. Under the Howey test, a
purchaser of an investment contract simply must expect profits from the efforts of others in
return for his capital outlay. 328 U.S. at 298-99. Instead of focusing on what Daniel and other
employees had been led to expect from the plan, the Court's analysis is limited to discerning
what they would receive.
.10 See text accompanying notes 12-15 supra.
31 99 S. Ct. at 797.
52 See text accompanying note 49 supra.
' See text accompanying note 16 supra.
u 99 S. Ct. at 798; see text accompanying notes 146-53 infra.
99 S. Ct. at 798; see note 144 supra.
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In addition to holding that Daniel's interest in the pension Fund was
not an investment contract, the Court considered whether past congres-
sional actions and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) interpreta-
tions of the Securities Acts required the application of the Acts' provisions
to Daniel's interest in the Fund. In 1934, Congress rejected an amendment
to section 4(1) of the '33 Act 6 which would have exempted employee stock
investment plans57 from the Act's registration requirements . 8 The SEC, as
amicus curiae in Daniel, argued that the defeat of an amendment that
would have removed certain extra compensation plans from the Act's pur-
view indicated Congress' intention to subject pension plans to the registra-
tion requirements.59 In rejecting the argument, the Court stated that the
purpose of the 1934 proposed amendment was to exempt plans under
which the beneficiaries were placing their own money in investment ac-
counts. 0 Such plans would meet the Howey investment contract criteria.6'
Therefore, Congress' rejection of the amendment only reflected its view
that schemes clearly involving securities sales should not be exempted
from the '33 Act's coverage merely because the profits they produce take
the form of extra compensation. 2 The amendment would not have ex-
empted all pension plans from registration, so its defeat had no bearing on
the characterization of the employee interests at issue in Daniel.13
In 1970, Congress amended section 3 of the '33 Act 4 to extend its
registration exemption to interests in trust funds maintained by banks and
issued in connection with certain pension plans. 5 In Daniel, the SEC con-
tended that the new registration exemption would have been unnecessary
56 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1976). Section 4 of the '33 Act exempts certain transactions from the
registration requirements of the Act.
11 99 S. Ct. at 798 n.17. In addition to exempting stock investment plans for employees'
exclusive benefit from the '33 Act's registration requirements, the amendment would have
exempted "bona fide plans for the payment of extra compensation .... 78 CONG. REc. 8708
(1934).
15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976); see note 2 supra.
5' 99 S. Ct. at 798.
Id. (citing H. R. REP. No. 1938, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1934)).
66 99 S. Ct. at 799; see text accompanying note 8 supra.
65 99 S. Ct. at 799.
Id. The Court's conclusion that the 1934 proposed amendment did not attempt to
categorize all pension plans as securities is logical only if the Court's underlying interpreta-
tion of the legislative history of the amendment is accurate. See text accompanying note 60
supra. The Court interpreted the House Report as indicating that the amendment would have
exempted from registration only extra compensation plans that created interests with the
characteristics of securities. 99 S. Ct. at 799. The language of the proposed amendment,
however, can be read to imply a presumption that all such plans have security characteristics.
See text accompanying note 57 supra. Moreover, the Court never relied on specific language
from the House Report to support its position in Daniel.
6, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1976).
Act of December 14, 1970, Pub. L. 91-547, § 27(b), (c), 84 Stat. 1434, 1498 (1970). The
amendment exempted interests issued in connection with pension plans which qualify as tax
exempt organizations. Id.; see I.R.C. §§ 401, 501.
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unless the interests covered by the amendment constituted securities."
Therefore, the interests would have been subject to the Act's antifraud
provisions notwithstanding the registration exemption." Relying on the
amendment's legislative history,6 8 the Daniel Court interpreted the
amendment as exempting only those interests that the covered plans have
in the trust funds." Since the amendment neither recognized the existence
of prospective beneficiaries' interests in the funds, nor characterized those
interests as securities, it was inapposite in the Daniel context. 0
Despite the lack of support that past congressional actions offered for
the view Securities Act applied to the pension plan in Daniel, the Court
could have deferred to any long-standing SEC interpretation of the Acts
indicating that the SEC had adopted that position.7 1 The Court's review
of prior SEC interpretations, however, revealed several occasions on which
the SEC itself had conceded that the Acts do not regulate compulsory,
noncontributory pension plans. 2 Most notably, the SEC had decided that
such plans do not involve a "sale" as required by the Acts.7 3 The Court
rejected the argument that the plan could be a security notwithstanding
the absence of a "sale."" Moreover, the Court held that the SEC's "no
" 99 S. Ct. at 799.
'7 Id. The Court adhered to the position that securities that are exempt from the Acts'
registration requirements nevertheless are subject to the Acts' antifraud provisions. Id. n.18;
see 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 112 (1979).
U 99 S. Ct. at 799 n.19.
69 Id.
70 99 S. Ct. at 799. In a brief concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger stated that the
Court's treatment of the ,1970 amendment was unnecessary to resolve the issue In Daniel. Id.
at 802. However, he agreed with the Court's conclusion that the SEC's interpretation of the
amendment was unconvincing. See text accompanying notes 68-69 supra. The Chief Justice
contended that even if the SEC's interpretation was correct, and Congress had intended to
subject pension plans to the Securities Acts' antifraud provisions in 1970, the original defini-
tional provisions in effect when Daniel acquired his interest in the Fund controlled. 99 S. Ct.
at 802 (Burger, C.J., concurring); accord, Waterman S. S. Corp. v. United States, 381 U.S.
252, 269 (1965); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 346-49 (1963); United
States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960).
11 99 S. Ct. at 799. See generally United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc.,
422 U.S. 694, 719 (1975); Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 74 (1974); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532, 538 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976).
72 99 S. Ct. at 800. While recognizing the propriety of according great weight to adminis-
trative interpretations of federal statutes, the Court noted that courts also should be con-
strained by their responsibility to adhere to the plain meaning of the statutes. Id. n.20.
However, in light of the Court's interpretation of the SEC's past position supporting the
applicability of the Securities Acts to compulsory, noncontributory pension plans, Justice
Powell did not address the necessity of deferring to administrative practices in deciding
Daniel. See text accompanying notes 73-75 infra.
n 99 S. Ct. at 800; see 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976) (unlawful to sell unregistered securities in
interstate commerce).
7, 99 S. Ct. at 800. Any disposition of a security for value, including a contract to sell, is
a "sale" under the Securities Acts. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b (3), 78c (14) (1976). In 1951, the SEC
promulgated Rule 133, which stated that mergers, consolidations, sales of assets and reclassi-
fications did not involve "sales." 17 C.F.R. § 230.133(a) (1978) (rescinded Jan. 1, 1973). But
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sale" position with respect to compulsory, noncontributory pension plans
applied equally to the Act's registration and antifraud provisions.75 Since
the SEC had concluded that the plans involved no sale, thereby limiting
the registration requirements' applicability, the Court would not adopt the
view that a sale was involved for purposes of the antifraud provisions.',
Having thus based its conclusion that the Acts do not govern compul-
sory, noncontributory pension plans on the language of the Acts, the case
law interpreting them, and congressional and administrative actions,77 the
Court also stated that the enactment of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA)7 had rendered the extension of the Securities Acts'
coverage to such plans unnecessary." By mandating information disclo-
sure" and regulating the substantive terms of pension plans, the Court
concluded ERISA provided potential plan beneficiaries the same protec-
tions that the Securities Acts afforded investors.8'
see note 75 infra. The Daniel Court noted, however, that SEC opinion letters, reports and
testimony have not addressed the issue of whether a sale is required for noncontributory
pension plans to constitute securities. 99 S. Ct. at 800. Consequently, the facts in Daniel did
not require the Court to decide whether to defer to administrative interpretations of the Acts
concerning this question. See id.; see also Hyde, Employee Stock Plans and the Securities
Act of 1933, 16 W. Ras. L. REv. 75, 86 (1964). See generally, Sommer, Mergers, Consolida-
tions, Sales of Assets-Rule 133, 16 W. RES. L. REv. 11 (1964).
11 99 S. Ct. at 800-01. As originally adopted, Rule 133 applied the SEC's "no sale"
position regarding mergers only to the '33 Act's registration requirements. 17 C.F.R. §
230.133(a) (1978) (rescinded Jan. 1, 1973); see Sommer, supra note 74, at 42-43. The SEC,
however, subsequently amended its position by promulgating Rule 145 which states that
statutory mergers do involve "sales" under the registration and antifraud provisions of the
'33 Act. 99 S. Ct. at 801 n.22; see 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(a) (1978). The Daniel Court noted that
the SEC's adoption of Rule 145 undercut the argument that SEC decisions that transactions
do not involve sales apply only to the scope of the Acts' registration requirements and not to
the Acts' antifraud provisions. 99 S. Ct. at 801 n.22. By holding that employee interests in
compulsory, noncontributory pension plans are not securities, the Court avoided the issue of
whether a sale of securities is required to invoke all of the Securities Acts' provisions. Id.
11 99 S. Ct. at 801.
7 See text accompanying notes 30-76 supra; note 158 infra.
Is 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976).
71 99 S. Ct. at 801-02.
80 ERISA requires that the administrators of pension benefit plans furnish covered em-
ployees with detailed information regarding the substantive terms and financial status of the
plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1021 (1976). Moreover, the same information must be filed with the
Secretary of Labor and made public information. Id. §§ 1023, 1026. However, the Securities
Acts would afford pensioners even greater protection against abuses in the administration of
pension plans. Most significantly, ERISA requires only that participants in plans be provided
with the disclosed information within 90 days after they join the plan. Id. § 1024 (b)(1). The
Securities Acts, in contrast, require that prospective purchasers of securities be given an
opportunity to inspect disclosed information before acquiring their interests. See note 2 supra.
See also Comment, Securities Regulation Of Employee Pension Plans: In The Wake Of The
Daniel Decision, 38 U. Prrr. L. REv. 697, 714-22 (1977).
1 99 S. Ct. at 802. But see note 80 supra. The Court stated that the purpose of ERISA
was to fill a void in the regulation of transactions subject to federal control. 99 S. Ct. at 802.
Section 203 of ERISA now establishes the continuous service requirements that pension
benefit plans are permitted to contain. 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (a) (1976). Since Daniel retired before
the effective date of ERISA, however, its provisions did not protect him. See id. § 1381.
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Most significantly, the Court's decision in Daniel expands the class of
cases in which the Howey test should be applied while narrowing the
definition of a security under the federal securities laws. In United Housing
Foundation v. Forman,2 the Court noted that the holding in Howey" es-
tablished the basis for all of the Court's decisions defining a security." The
Forman Court, however, applied the Howey test only to determine whether
the economic interests in question constituted investment contracts. In
deciding whether the interests were "stock" under the Acts, the Court did
not rely on the Howey test." The Forman Court implicitly reasoned that
- 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
3 See text accompanying note 8 supra.
" 421 U.S. at 852. Most of the Supreme Court decisions defining a security subsequent
to Howey have contained at least passing specific referenc6s to the Howey test. See, e.g.,
United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851-57 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S.
332, 338-39 (1967); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 72 n.13 (1959). But
see SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967). In United Benefit, the Court
relied on its analysis in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943), and did not
cite Howey. 387 U.S. at 211. The Joiner Court held that the character of an economic relation-
ship in commerce determines its status as an investment contract. 320 U.S. at 352-53. The
Court noted that in assessing an instrument "the terms of the offer, the plan of distribution,
and the economic inducements held out to the prospect," establish its character in commerce.
Id. In Howey, the Court stated that its definition of an investment contract, see text accompa-
nying note 8 supra, was merely a clarification of the Joiner test. 328 U.S. at 299. Joiner's
"terms of the offer" element thus can be equated with Howey's requirement of an investment
of money in a common enterprise. The Howey Court expressed Joiner's "plan of distribution"
factor as the requirement that the transaction involve profit sharing. Under the Howey test,
the "economic inducements held out to the prospect" must lead him to develop a reasonable
expectation that the profits will be earned. Id. at 299-301. Thus, both tests were designed to
facilitate discerning the character an instrument has been given in commerce, the Joiner test
in general terms and the Howey test in more specific terms. Nevertheless, some courts still
address the two tests as though they establish different criteria for an investment contract.
See SEC v. Energy Group of America, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 1234, 1238-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
Courts should not rely solely on the Joiner test when the Howey test offers more specific
guidance for establishing the existence of an investment contract. See Tew & Freedman,
supra note 3, at 410-11, 448. A more general test's greatest attribute is the freedom courts
retain to effectuate the remedial purposes of the Securities Acts through novel adaptations
of the test. See text accompanying note 149 infra. Courts applying the Howey test, however,
have been able to apply it flexibly to meet novel situations calling for federal regulation. See
SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterp., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973); 1977-78 Developments, supra
note 2, at 771-73 (modification of "solely from efforts of others" requirement). In spite of the
greater specificity and equal flexibility of the Howey test, some courts still rely on the Joiner
criteria to analyze instruments as investment contracts. See, e.g., Grainger v. State Sec. Life
Ins. Co., 547 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 932 (1978); Hilgeman v. National
Ins. Co. of America, 547 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1977).
421 U.S. at 847-51. In deciding that the shareholder interests in the cooperative were
not securities, the Forman Court stated that the name given to an interest does not necessar-
ily control its status as a security. Id. at 848. The dispositive factor was whether the transac-
tion created interests with the characteristics of traditional stocks, or, alternatively, whether
purchasers believed that they were buying interests with such characteristics. Id. at 851. The
shares in Forman were not freely alienable, and they did not entitle the holders to receive
dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits. Each shareholder's voting rights in
the cooperative bore no relation to the number of shares respectively held. Id. at 842. Further-
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if the shares had constituted "stock," the Acts would have applied to the
transaction whether or not the Howey investment contract criteria had
been met. Therefore, Daniel relied on Forman to support his contention
that if his interest in the Fund was not an investment contract, it was a
"certificate of interest in a profit-sharing agreement."86 The Daniel Court's
determination that all certificates of interest in profit-sharing agreements
constitute investment contracts obviated the need to address Daniel's al-
ternative argument." Thus the Court appears willing to apply the Howey
test to determine whether an economic interest is regulated by the Securi-
ties Acts regardless of what type of security the plaintiff claims to have
purchased.8
Although commentators have advocated the use of the Howey test to
determine whether economic interests constitute a type of security other
than investment contracts,89 few courts have done so. In United Sportfish-
ers v. Buffo,9° however, the Ninth Circuit applied Howey generically. The
plaintiff in Buffo alleged fraud under the '34 Act,9' claiming that promis-
sory notes, which he took in consideration for the sale of.two boats, were
securities. 2 The Securities Acts' definition of a security includes any
note. 3 Applying the Howey test in light of the Forman decision, 4 the court
more, the shareholders understood from the outset the limited nature of the rights to which
their shares entitled them. Id. at 851. Therefore, the shares were not "stocks" within the Acts'
definitional sections. Id.
11 99 S. Ct. at 796 n.11. Certificates of interest in profit-sharing agreements are specifi-
cally enumerated securities under the '33 and '34 Acts. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(1), 78c
(a)(10)(1976).
11 99 S. Ct. at 796 n.11. The Court stated that Daniel did not posit a broader meaning
for "certificates of interest in profit sharing plans" than the Howey Court established for
"investment contracts." In effect, the Court read "investment contract" in the Securities
Acts to be a generic term encompassing at least one of the specific forms of securities enunci-
ated in the Acts. Id.
Is The Court's generic use of the Howey test is improper since long term notes, which do
not necessarily meet the Howey criteria, are securities as defined in the Acts. See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77(b)(1), 77c(3), 78c(a)(10) (1976); text accompanying notes 97-101 infra.
11 See Newton, What Is a Security?: A Critical Analysis, 48 Miss. L. J. 167, 170 n.21
(1977); Tew & Freedman, supra note 37 at 408-09.
o [1978 Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,708 (9th Cir. 1978).
91 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978). See generally 1978-79 Securities
Law Developments: Rule 10b-5, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. (1979).
[1978 Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,708 at 94,743.
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(1), 78c(a) (10) (1976). Any note that matures in less than nine months
is exempt from the '33 and '34 Acts' registration requirements. Id. §§ 77c(3), 78c(a)(10). For
a discussion of notes as securities see Comment, Notes as Securities Under the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 36 MD. L. REV. 233 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Notes as Securities] (suggesting application of the Howey test to differentiate between
notes that are securities and notes that are not). But see text accompanying notes 97-101
infra.
"1 [1978 Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,708 at 94,743-44. Relying on Forman,
the Buffo court reasoned that the Acts govern only investment transactions, and not every
commercial deal. Id. Courts analyzing notes as securities emphasize that the context of the
transaction determines the note's character. Notes as Securities, supra note 93, at 237-39.
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held that the notes did not constitute securities because the plaintiff had
not taken the notes with an expectation of realizing profits from the defen-
dants' efforts. 5 Although the Forman Court arguably did not hold that the
Howey test should be used to characterize all transactions," the Buffo
court, anticipating the Daniel decision, read Forman broadly and thereby
extended Howey's applicability.
Despite the holding in Buffo, notes should not be analyzed under the
Howey test to determine their status as securities. Under the Howey test,
notes would constitute securities only in the rare circumstance in which
the note entitles the holder to share in the profits of the enterprise obtain-
ing credit. 7 The presence of such a provision in. an instrument, however,
has no bearing on whether the instrument is a note.98 Moreover, the Acts
specifically apply to all notes99 without regard to their extraneous terms.90
The Buffo court's analysis therefore narrows the Acts' purview by contrav-
ening their express language. 1 '
In contrast to Buffo, the district court in Titsch Printing, Inc. v.
Hastings"°2 read Forman narrowly.0 3 The plaintiff had purchased all of the
Notes that courts consider investments generally are labeled securities. In mere commercial
note transactions, however, notes do not constitute securities. Id. at 242-44.
[1978 Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,708 (9th Cir. 1978).
" See Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1136-37 (2d Cir. 1976)
(Howey test inapplicable in defining notes as securities); text accompanying notes 113-17
infra.
11 See Notes as Securities, supra note 93, at 251-53. Assuming that the interest paid on
most notes constitutes profit, Howey's "efforts of others" element would not be met. Interest
paid on notes rarely depends upon the maker's successful investment of the loaned funds.
Id. at 252; see C.N.S. Enterp. v. G. & G. Enterp., 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1975).
98 A note is a "written unconditional promise to pay another a certain sum of money at
a certain time, or at a time which must certainly arrive." Aetna Oil Co. v. Glenn, 53 F. Supp.
961, 965 (W.D. Ky. 1944); accord, Commissioner v. Meridian & Thirteenth Realty Co., 132
F.2d 182, 188 n.7 (7th Cir. 1942). The form of payment is irrelevant so long as the instrument
meets this definition. 53 F. Supp. at 965.
"1 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(b)(1), 78c(a)(10) (1976). In addition to notes and other specific types
of securities, the Acts apply "generally to any instrument or interest commonly known as a
security." Id. Since only notes with investment characteristics are regarded in commerce as
securities, see Notes as Securities, supra note 93, at 237 n.15, the general definitional clause
in the Securities Acts may be read to limit the class of notes that are securities to notes that
meet the Howey test. Id. at 237 n.15, 248-49. This interpretation of the Acts nevertheless
requires a broad application of Howey's "efforts of others" criterion since the profits realized
by a note payee usually do not result from the payor's efforts. See text accompanying note
96 supra.
,00 The only provision of a note that will exempt the note from the Acts' registration
requirements.is a maturation period of less than 9 months. See text accompanying note 93
supra.
"I' The Buffo Court reasoned that its narrow interpretation of the Acts' definitional
sections was consonant with the Supreme Court's recent restrictions on the scope of federal
securities law. [1978 Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,708 at 94,744 n.3; see text
accompanying note 1 supra.
202 456 F. Supp. 445 (D. Colo. 1978). The plaintiff in Titsch Printing alleged violations
of the antifraud provisions of the '33 Act and SEC Rule 10b-5. Id. at 447.
"' See text accompanying notes 82-86 supra.
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stock outstanding in two corporations from the defendant and alleged that
the transaction constituted a sale of securities.0 4 The court reasoned that
Forman did not require that the Howey analysis be used as a generic test
for defining a security."5 Since the term "stock" has an established com-
mon law and statutory meaning, the Howey test was not needed to charac-
terize the economic interests in Titsch Printing. 10
The court in Titsch Printing held that the shares in question were
"stocks,' 107 thereby leaving unclear whether the court would have applied
the Howey test to characterize the economic interests as investment con-
tracts. In Forman, the Court applied the Howey test to determine whether
interests constituted investment contracts after it applied a different test
to assess the interests as stock.' Since the Titsch Printing court relied on
Forman to define "stock," presumably it would have adhered to the
Forman analysis by assessing the shares as investment contracts under the
Howey test if they had failed to qualify as "stocks." Arguably, if Howey
should be applied each time a court finds that an economic interest does
not fall within one of the specific securities listed in the Acts' definitional
sections, common sense may dictate the test's application at the outset. 09
Notwithstanding Titsch Printing's implications, the. court's reasoning
suggests a fundamental barrier to the application of Howey as a generic
test to establish the existence of a security. The court noted that dividends
on the shares were contingent on the apportionment of profits as required
under the Forman definition of stock."0 These profits, however, would not
be realized from the efforts of others because the plaintiff acquired the
entire corporate structure supporting the shares."' Consequently, whether
the shares produced dividends was contingent primarily on the share-
holder's efforts. Thus, while economic interests that are not within one of
the specific classes of securities listed in the Acts nevertheless may meet
the Howey test, "2 an interest that is within one of the specific classes might
not. The use of Howey as a generic test for a security could thereby con-
travene the specific language of the Securities Acts."'
"o 456 F. Supp. at 447.
,05 Id. at 449.
'o' Id. at 447-49.
107 Id. at 448.
,03 See text accompanying note 85 supra.
10 See Notes as Securities, supra note 93, at 242-54.
110 456 F. Supp. at 447-48; see note 85 supra.
"1 456 F. Supp. at 448.
112 See text accompanying notes 82-85 supra.
,,3 See H. BLOOMENTHAL, 1 SEcURrrms AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW REPORT MoNTHLY
UPDATE 8 (1979); cf. Bula v. Mansfield, No. 76-F-871 (D. Colo. May 13, 1978) (holding
purchase of all outstanding shares in corporation not an investment contract since Howey's
"efforts of others" element not met).
The Tenth Circuit has avoided resolving the conflict between Titsch Printing and Bula.
In Chandler v. KEW, Inc., No. 76-1083 (10th Cir. April 19, 1977), the court held that when
all of the shares in a close corporation are sold to one person, the purchaser does not acquire
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Prior to Daniel, the Titsch Printing court's narrow reading of Forman
appeared proper. Rather than applying the Howey test to determine
whether the shares in question were stock, the Forman Court explicitly
relied on other factors."' Significantly, while deciding that the payment of
dividends was one characteristic of "stock," the Forman Court did not
require that the efforts of others produce the dividends." 5 Thus, the
Forman definition of "stock" is not synonomous with the Howey test."6
Additionally, when the Forman Court stated that the elements of the
Howey test were central to all of the Court's decisions defining a security,
it was addressing the issues of whether the shares were investment con-
tracts or something "commonly known as a 'security.' ""17 Thus, the
Forman Court used the Howey test only to analyze classes of securities
which have no generally acknowledged meaning. The Daniel Court, how-
ever, by analogizing investment contracts to a more specific class of secu-
rity,' can be read as treating Howey as a generic definition of a security."'
Although Daniel suplorts the use of the Howey test to assess the char-
acter of all transactions as securities, the Court's decision represents a
strict application of the test's requirements. According to Howey, an in-
vestment contract exists when an economic interest is acquired with a
reasonable expectation that profits will be derived from the efforts of oth-
ers. In previous cases involving the purchase of economic interests with
both profit and nonprofit aspects, the Court had been willing to isolate the
two aspects for analytical purposes.' If any profit related interests were
found, the nonprofit interests did not preclude a determination that the
securities if the shares are merely an indicia of ownership incidental to the purchase of the
corporation. The Titsch Printing court reasoned that the corporate structure represented by
the shares that the plaintiff purchased was used by the plaintiff to direct his additional
business enterprises. Consequently, the shares themselves, and not the corporation, were the
substance of the purchase. 456 F. Supp. at 448.
"I See note 85 supra.
15 Id.
"1 See text accompanying notes 110-13 supra.
"W 421 U.S. at 851; see Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338 (1967); SEC v. United
Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202, 211 (1967); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359
U.S. 65, 67-68 (1959); SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946); SEC v. C. M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943). The phrase "commonly known as a security" appears
in the Acts' definitional sections as a general catchall category of securities. See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77b(1), 78c(a)(10) (1976).
"M 99 S. Ct. at 796 n.11. The Court equated investment contracts and certificates of
interest in profit sharing plans. See text accompanying note 87 supra.
"M See text accompanying notes 89-96 supra. While the Daniel Court appears to read
Forman expansively, the Court's decision also can be interpreted consistently with the narrow
interpretation of the Forman decision. See text accompanying notes 101-04 supra. In Forman,
the established definition of "stock" obviated the need to apply the Howey test to define stock
as a security. See note 85 supra. Since the characteristics of certificates of interest in profit
sharing plans are not defined clearly, equating that class of securities with investment con-
tracts is not necessarily inconsistent with Forman.
'I See SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202, 207-09 (1967); text accompany-
ing notes 124-34 infra.
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transaction was profit oriented.'2 ' The Daniel Court recognized that part
of the Fund's value, from which pension benefits were paid, represented
returns on investments of the Fund's nonprofit related assets. 22 Neverthe-
less, the Court chose to analyze the Fund as whole, and characterized the
employees' interest as a noninvestment interest because most of the Fund's
assets were not profit related.'
23
In SEC v. United Benefit Life Insurance Co.,' 2 4 the Court addressed for
the first time the issue of when a contractual relationship, which promises
the purchaser both profit and nonprofit related interests, should be treated
as two separate transactions for the purposes of securities analysis. United
Benefit had sold policies that required purchasers to pay a monthly prem-
ium which the company placed in a separate fund account for investment,
primarily in common stock.'1 Prior to his policy's maturity date, the pur-
chaser could withdraw his proportionate share of the total fund or receive
a percentage of the net premiums that he had paid. The SEC contended
that the characteristics of a security permeated this part of the policy.' 26
Upon his policy's maturity, the purchaser could elect either to receive the
cash value of his policy or to convert his interest into a fixed amount
annuity.' The parties agreed that the Security Acts' registration require-
121 See text accompanying notes 124-34 infra.
'2 99 S. Ct. at 797. The Court noted that the pension Fund in Daniel was similar to all
organizations designed to hold accumulated assets in that the Fund's viability depended in
part on supplementing existing assets with the income earned from their investment. Id. The
Court also recognized that only 20 percent of the Fund's $191.5 million total assets were profit
related. Id. at 798 n.14.
1 See text accompanying note 137 infra.
.24 387 U.S. 202 (1967).
11 Id. at 205. Traditionally, insurance companies have invested their assets predomi-
nantly by financing long term corporate debt in the form of bonds and mortgage loans rather
than purchasing equity interests. Johnson & Hofflander, The Impact of Investment Regula-
tion in the Life Insurance Industry, 510 INs. L. J. 389, 391 (1965). Thus, insurance company
investment policies have emphasized security as much as earnings. Id. Due to its emphasis
on common stock, the "Flexible Fund" at issue in United Benefit was distinct from typical
insurance investment accounts. The policyholders' net premiums, which were placed in the
Flexible Fund for investment, represented the total premiums reduced by amounts necessary
to meet the company's operational expenses. 387 U.S. at 205.
"1 387 U.S. at 205. The net premiums paid on policies plus whatever income their
investment produced constituted the Flexible Fund's total assets. A policyholder'i propor-
tionate share of the Fund included the premiums he had paid, plus his proportional share of
the Fund's earnings. Id. Thepercentage of the policyholder's paid net premiums available
for withdrawal as an alternative to his proportionate share of the Fund increased each year.
Id. After 10 years, the policyholder could withdraw from the Fund all of the net premiums
he had paid. Id.
127 Id. at 205-06. Once the policy had matured and the policyholder had elected either to
withdraw his interest or convert it into a life annuity, his interest in the Flexible Fund ended.
Id. at 206. His withdrawable interest at maturity was determined by either the proportionate
share method or the net premium percentage guarantee. See note 126 supra. Life annuities
provide for payments at regular intervals during the annuitant's entire life. See Johnson, The
Variable Annuity; What It Is and Why It Is Needed, 401 INS. L. J. 357, 361-62 (1956). Under
fixed amount life annuities, which were offered by United Benefit as part of its Flexible Fund
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ments did not govern the post-maturity portion of the policy.'2 8 Purchasers
who elected to convert their interest into fixed amount annuities thereby
acquired a form of insurance exempt from registration.' 21 Moreover, the
purchaser always lost his interest in the investment fund upon his policy's
maturity.'30 Therefore, the question before the Court was whether the non-
profit nature of the post-maturity relationship governed the characteriza-
tion of the entire transaction.'3' The contract contained two promises, 32
Policy, the annuitant receives the same sum with each payment the company makes. Id. at
362. The amounts that an annuitant is entitled to receive per dollar invested, as annuity
payments, are determined according to mortality rates, expected interest, and administrative
costs. 387 U.S. at 207. Since the life annuity guarantees payments during the annuitant's
lifetime, the insurance company bears the risk that all annuity policyholders will live long
lives. The company is able to continue to make payments to policyholders who live unusually
long lives only because other policyholders, who have paid for the right to receive payments
during an average lifespan as determined by the mortality tables, die prematurely. Funds
that would have been paid to the policyholders who die prematurely are used to pay unusually
long-living policyholders. See Johnson, supra at 362.
'28 387 U.S. at 206.
'2 15 U.S:C. § 77c (8) (1976). The SEC recently amended Parts 231 and 271 of Title 17
of the Code of Federal Regulations by issuing a General Statement of Policy Regarding
Exemptive.Provisions Relating to Annuity and Insurance Contracts. Securities Release No.
6051, 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 2111 (1979). In order for a contract to be exempt from the
'33 Act's disclosure requirements pursuant to § 3(a)(8), the insurance company offering the
contract must assume significant mortality and investment risks. Id. at 2579-3. An offering
company does not assume a significant mortality risk unless the contract guarantees annuity
payouts at particularized rates. Id. Additionally, if the contract is sold to individuals directly
the purchase rates must be permanently guaranteed. Id. When the contract is sold to a group
that makes payments in bulk without allocations for individual members the company as-
sumes a mortality risk if the purchase rates are guaranteed for a "reasonable period of time,"
defined by the SEC as five years. Id. at 2579-4. Contracts that do not include these purchase
rate provisions do not place a significant mortality risk on the company and therefore are not
insurance or annuity contracts. Moreover, if the annuity benefits are so low that the purchaser
probably would not choose to annuitize at the time of his election, the purchase rate guaran-
tee will not suffice to place the required mortality risk on the company. Id. The SEC also
takes the position that the economic realities of a transaction may lead to the conclusion that
the company has not assumed a significant mortality risk. Id. at 2579-4 to -5. For instance,
the company assumes less mortality risk when it sells annuity contracts to younger people.
Id. n.9. The Release offers no definitive guidelines as to the purchaser age at which a company
would fail to assume an adequate mortality risk.
A contract that places a significant investment risk on the purchaser also fails to meet
the requirements for exemption under § 3(a)(8). Id. at 2579-3. In resolving this issue, the SEC
has determined that the contract terms and the circumstances surrounding the offer and sale
of the contract must be considered. Id. at 2579-5. Specifically, a company's marketing prac-
tices that promote the contracts as investments will remove the contracts from the scope of
the exemption provided in § 3(a)(8) of the '33 Act.
'" 387 U.S. at 206; see text accompanying note 117 supra.
13, 387 U.S. at 204. A second issue raised in United Benefit was whether the Flexible Fund
constituted an investment company under the Investment Company Act of 1940. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80a-3 (defining investment company), 80a-8 (registration of investment companies)
(1976). The Court avoided the issue, noting that United Benefit probably was beyond the
scope of the Act since its primary business was issuing insurance policies. 387 U.S. at 212;
see 15 U.S.C. § § 80a-3(b) (1976). The Court expressed no opinion on whether the Fund itself
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each operating at a different point in time. More importantly, the promises
were not interdependent since either could have been contracted for inde-
pendently. 3 ' Consequently, the Court analyzed the pre-maturity portion
of the contract independently, holding that it was not insurance, but was
an investment contract.'34
Courts analyzing single transactions in which plaintiffs have acquired
both investment and noninvestment interests may have difficulty reconcil-
ing Daniel with United Benefit.' In United Benefit, the Court analyzed
the two aspects of the transaction separately because the company's per-
formance of one part of the contract was not an integral part of its perform-
ance of the other. 6 The Daniel Court, however, offered no explanation for
could be separated from the company's other activities and subjected to a determination of
its status as an investment company. 387 U.S. at 212.
"I United Benefit first promised its Flexible Fund policyholders that the company would
invest their net premiums, making the Fund's assets available to the policyholders before the
policies' maturity dates. The company also promised to give policyholders the opportunity
to convert their share of the Fund's assets into a fixed amount annuity upon their policies'
maturation. See text accompanying notes 116-17 supra.
113 387 U.S. at 209. The Court emphasized that the company could have promised to
invest net premium payments without also promising to guarantee a life annuity upon the
policy's maturation. Id. Although United Benefit's Flexible Fund policies always contained
both promises, the Court relied on the practice of another company to illustrate United
Benefit's ability to separate its policy provisions and offer each one independently. Id. n.13.
387 U.S. at 207.
' Few lower courts have addressed the question of when the character of diverse provi-
sions of a single transaction should be analyzed separately under the Securities Act. See, e.g.,
Hilgeman v. National Ins. Co. of America, 444 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1976). The plaintiffs in
Hilgeman alleged fraud by an insurance company, which had sold them contracts that the
plaintiffs claimed were securities. Id. at 446-47. The Fifth Circuit remanded'the case because
the record did not specify the grounds upon which the district court had dismissed the
plaintiff's complaint. Id. at 448. On remand, the district court held that even if the contracts
constituted securities, the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Further-
more, the court stated that venue was improper. Brief for Appellant, Supplemental App. at
11-15, Hilgeman v. National Life Ins. Co. of America, 547 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1977). In their
second appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the district court had personal jurisdiction, that
venue was proper, and that the policies were non-exempt securities. Brief for Appellant,
Hilgeman v. National Life Ins. Co. of America, 547 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1977). The plaintiffs
claimed that since the contracts provided for the payment of dividends as well as insurance
benefits, United Benefit required the policies to be characterized as securities. Id. at 61-62.
The Fifth Circuit however, did not address the issue, deciding only that the test formulated
in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943), see text accompanying notes 6 &
80 supra, should be used on remand to assess the plaintiffs' claim that the policies were
securities. 547 F.2d at 300.
"I' See text accompanying notes 123-24 supra. The Hilgeman case, see note 135 supra, is
similar to both Daniel and United Benefit in that the contracts involved have both non-
security and traditional security elements. Although the Daniel Court refused to take a
bifurcated approach in analyzing the economic interests under the Acts, see text accompany-
ing notes 137-42 infra, the Hilgeman court must decide whether the United Benefit approach
can be applied. The Daniel Court emphasized that Daniel had made essentially an employ-
ment decision by accepting an interest in the pension Fund. 99 S. Ct. at 797. Looking to the
economic reality of the transaction in United Benefit, the Court concluded that purchasers
of Flexible Fund Annuity contracts were motivated primarily by the contracts' investment
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analyzing, as an indivisible package, the diverse economic interests Daniel
received in return for his labor.13 Clearly the two analyses are dissimilar
since Daniel may have prevailed under the United Benefit approach.3 8 In
United Benefit, the' Court emphasized the fact that the company could
have sold fixed amount annuities independently of interests in the Flexible
Fund.13 Daniel's employer likewise could have paid his employees a salary
without also agreeing to provide pension benefits."' Under this analysis,
the fact that Daniel's labors could not be allocated between the two parts
of his compensation package is irrelevant, and his interest in the Pension
Fund's assets would be assessed as a security independently of his interest
in wages.' The effect of ignoring this analysis in Daniel was particularly
potential. 387 U.S. at 211. Viewed in this manner, Daniel and United Benefit are distinguish-
able and courts should not read Daniel to preclude the application of United Benefit's analy-
sis to assess transactions that create diverse economic interests. See also note 126 supra.
13 99 S. Ct. at 797; see text accompanying note 43 supra.
I's Applying the United Benefit approach to the facts in Daniel would have led to the
conclusion that Daniel's interest in the Fund was a security only if all of the elements of the
Howey test had been satisfied. See text accompanying notes 134 supra & 140-47 infra.
"1 387 U.S. at 209. In United Benefit, the Court noted that in addition to being able to
sell annuities independently of Flexible Fund interests, the company also could have sold
interests in'the Flexible Fund without promising to make a fixed amount annuity available
to the purchasers. Id.
"' The fact that the pension plan in Daniel was actually a part of the employees' com-
pensation package is irrelevant under the United Benefit approach. The policy in United
Benefit also was offered as a package which contained both security and non-security ele-
ments. See text accompanying notes 118-24 supra. In United Benefit, the dispositive fact was
the company's ability to offer each element independently. 387 U.S. at 209.
Whether, as in United Benefit, see note 139 supra, the defendants in Daniel also could
have promised the security portion of the interest package without providing the nonsecurity
portion is less clear. Employees probably would not agree to work only for future compensa-
tion with the characteristics of securities without also receiving a present salary. However,
the Court's conclusion in United Benefit that either portion of the Flexible Fund annuity
contract could have been sold independently was based on the fact that in practice their
operation was not integrated. 387 U.S. at 208-09. In Daniel, the payments of salaries and
pension benefits likewise were not integrated since an employee who was not paid during a
break in his service could have maintained his pension eligibility by contributing to the Fund
on his own behalf. 99 S. Ct. at 794 n.4. Thus, for analytical purposes under United Benefit,
Daniel's employer could have contracted to pay employees pension benefits without also
agreeing to pay them present salaries.
"' The Daniel Court held that the plaintiff had not invested a specific consideration in
return for his interest in the pension Fund. 99 S. Ct. at 797. The Court, however, based its
holding on a conclusion that Daniel had exchanged his labor for an indivisible compensation
package. See text accompanying notes 127-29 supra. Arguably, if the Court had applied the
analysis from United Benefit, see note 123 supra, and treated each part of Daniel's compensa-
tion package separately, part of his labor properly would have been regarded as consideration
exchanged for the pension benefits. The Daniel Court recognized that the United Benefit
Court had allocated the consideration exchanged in that case between the security and
nonsecurity portions of the policy once the Court had determined that the policyholder's
interests were severable. 99 S. Ct. at 796. Thus, the Daniel Court's decision that Daniel had
not met Howey's investment or exchange of valuable consideration requirement, see note 127
supra, hinged on its refusal to apply United Benefit to establish the severability of Daniel's
dissimilar interests in the pension Fund. However, the Court's analysis of Howey's "solely
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significant, since where the economic interests are indivisible the entire
transaction probably will not be an investment contract under the Court's
reasoning.'
The Daniel Court's refusal to apply the United Benefit analysis to
determine when diverse portions of a single economic interest should be
analyzed separately to assess their investment character limited the class
of transactions subject to the Securities Acts. The Court also restricted the
definition of a security by changing that part of the Howey test that re-
quires the expected return on investments to result solely from the efforts
of others.' Lower courts have adhered to the original Howey standard for
this part of the test by determining whose efforts produced the profits.'
from the efforts of others" criterion would have precluded a finding that Daniel's interest in
the Fund was a security. See text accompanying notes 143-47 infra.
"I When the Daniel Court analyzed Daniel's diverse interests as a whole, it noted that
the investment portions were insignificant when compared to the non-investment portions.
99 S.Ct. at 797. However, the Court offered no guidance for determining at what point an
investment interest becomes sufficiently significant to treat the entire transaction as an
investment contract.
"I Id. at 797-98. See generally Tew & Freedman, supra note 37, at 424-34; 1977-78
Developments, supra note 2, at 771-73; note 6 supra.
"' Recent decisions evidence novel means of addressing the "solely" aspect of Howey's
"solely from the efforts of others" criterion. See generally 1977-78 Developments, supra note
2, at 771-73. Two cases adopting the "no managerial efforts" standard in place of Howey's
"solely" requirement are Peyton v. Morrow Elec., Inc., 587 F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1978) and
Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1978). The "no managerial efforts" standard
requires that only the functions which are most important to the success of an enterprise need
be performed by others in order to establish Howey's "efforts of others" element. SEC v.
Glenn W. Turner Enterp. Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482-83 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821
(1973). In Peyton, the plaintiff was the marketing manager for the defendant's sales opera-
tions. 587 F.2d at 414. His employment contract provided that he would receive a salary plus
a percentage of the organization's gross sales. In addition, an informal agreement with his
employer gave the plaintiff the right to exchange his services for shares in the company. Id.
The Peyton court adopted the "no managerial efforts" test to determine whether the contract
and agreement constituted a security. Since the plaintiffs efforts as marketing manager
directly affected the financial success of the company, the court held that no purchase of
securities had occurred. Id. at 415.
Goodman involved the question of whether limited partnership shares constituted securi-
ties. Under state law, limited partners were prohibited from participating in the managerial
affairs of the parternship. 582 F.2d at 408. Nevertheless, one of the limited partners in
Goodman had been primarily responsible for financing the partnership. Id. Although the
partnership's success depended upon sound financing, the court held that the purchase of the
limited partnership shares met the "no managerial efforts" standard. Id. The court reasoned
that the financing efforts did not "overcome" .the effect of the state law prohibiting manage-
rial functions by limited partners, nor did they alter the basic nature of the limited partners'
interests as securities. Id.
Both Peyton and Goodman illustrate that the accepted interpretation of the "efforts of
others" criteria focuses on whose efforts will produce profits. In Pdyton, the court noted that
the plaintiffs managerial efforts directly affected his company's sales success. 587 F.2d at
415. In Goodman, only a broad interpretation of the "no managerial efforts" standard permit-
ted the court to hold that financing an enterprise, which would have collapsed without
funding, was an insignificant managerial function performed by the investor. 582 F.2d at 408.
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In contrast, the Daniel Court addressed the issue by determinin whether
the investor's receipt of profits was contingent on the efforts of others and
not on who produced the profits.'45 The Court stated that if the other
elements of the Howey test had been met,"' the employees' interests in the
Fund nevertheless would depend primarily upon the employees' ability to
meet the plan's eligibility requirements. 4 However, the plan only pro-
vided that the employees' receipt of the hypothetical profits was contin-
gent upon their fulfillment of the requirements. The profits themselves
would exist regardless of whether the requirements had been met. Transac-
tions which have met the Howey test's criteria in the past would not have
constituted investment contracts under the Daniel Court's analysis since
the investor always has control over whether he will receive earned prof-
its.' Even assuming that the limitation Daniel thus places on the defini-
tion of a security is justifiable in light of the remedial purposes of the
Acts,"49 the facts in Daniel did not justify invoking the limitation. The fact
that Daniel's failure to meet the plan's eligibility requirements was invol-
untary' 0 should have convinced the Court that Daniel's lack of effort was
not necessarily the greatest barrier to his receipt of benefits.' 5'
While the Court appears willing to standardize judicial analysis defin-
ing a security,'52 its decision in Daniel indicates a continuing restriction of
the scope of the Securities Acts. The Court will be reluctant to analyze the
investment aspects of a transaction independently of its noninvestment
features.' 53 Consequently, the Court's new standard for Howey's
"investment of money" element, requiring the exchange of an, identifiable
consideration for a separable investment interest,'54 will be difficult to
meet. The Court used an inapposite factor to determine whether profits are
1"1 99 S. Ct. at 798.
1"' See text accompanying notes 33-55 supra.
", 99 S. Ct. at 798; see text accompanying note 16 supra.
,, See, e.g., SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967). In United Benefit,
if a purchaser of a Flexible Fund Annuity contract had refused to pay premiums prior to his
policy's maturity date, he would have breached his contract with the company, terminating
the company's obligation to provide him with an interest in the Flexible Fund's assets. See
387 U.S. at 205; text accompanying notes 114-23 supra. Despite the ultimate control the
purchaser thus exercised over his right to an interest in the Flexible Fund's assets, the United
Benefit Court held that the post maturity portion of the contract constituted a security. See
text accompanying notes 124-34 supra.
"' See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946); SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 353 (1943); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 2, 48 Stat. 881
(1934); Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933).
150 See text accompanying note 18 supra.
M' The effect of the Court's analysis of Howey's "efforts of others" element on future
attempts to define a security is unclear. Since the Court could have denied Daniel relief under
the Acts based on its interpretation of the "investment of money" requirement, see text
accompanying notes 34-41 supra, its "efforts of others" analysis was unnecessary to the
Court's holding. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
152 See text accompanying notes 82-119 supra.
'5 See text accompanying notes 120-44 supra.
"1 99 S. Ct. at 796-97.
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